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INTRODUCTION
In this case, plaintiff/appellant Steven Graham (“Graham”) seeks to
avoid the procedure and remedy established by the Utah legislature for
complaints of alleged retaliatory termination in violation of the Utah
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“UOSH Act”) in order to pursue a
common-law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. He does
so because he “prefer[s] . . . the claims and remedies which are available in
[tort]” over those available under the UOSH Act. (Declaration of Steven Eric
Graham, R. 0075-0077, ¶ 12.)
Graham’s preference is irrelevant in this case. The Utah legislature has
already addressed the precise injury for which Graham seeks to recover in tort
and specified a detailed scheme for the handling of complaints of such an
injury. As a result, Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is properly analyzed
using the indispensable element test, which this Court adopted in Retherford
v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., as “the correct analytical
model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses a common
law remedy.” 844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992). The district court correctly
analyzed Graham’s wrongful discharge claim under the indispensable element
test and determined that, under that test, Graham’s claim is preempted by the
UOSH Act. (R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.) Graham omits any mention in his Brief of
Appellant (“Opening Brief”) of the district court’s analysis and rejection of
1

his claim under the indispensable element test. But the district court’s analysis
of his claim under that test is dispositive of both his claim and this appeal.
In his Opening Brief, Graham challenges only the portion of the district
court’s ruling holding that his wrongful discharge claim is preempted under
the more generally applicable field preemption analysis applied by this Court
in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002
UT 95. As set forth below, however, the district court also correctly concluded
that Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted under a field preemption
analysis, and Graham’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the order of the district court dismissing
Graham’s wrongful discharge claim as preempted by the UOSH Act.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Issue Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Albertson’s
partial summary judgement dismissing Graham’s claim of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy as preempted by the UOSH Act, including but not
limited to Section 203 thereof (“Section 203”). Utah Code § 34A-6-203 (copy
attached hereto as Addendum Item 1).
Standard of Appellate Review A ruling on summary judgment is
reviewed for correctness without deference to its legal conclusions. Gottling v.
P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95, ¶ 5.

2

Preservation

The issue on appeal was directly presented to and

decided by the district court in its Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Perform Discovery
Related to Defendant’s Wealth. (R. 585-589.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

FACTS OF THE CASE
On or about December 6, 2016, Graham suffered a minor injury to his

back while lifting a bag of potatoes at Albertson’s Distribution Center in Salt
Lake City. (R. 0002 ¶ 7, 0115, 0132, 0272, 0322-0324, 0365-0366.) Graham
reported his injury to his supervisor, who completed an injury report with
Graham and assisted Graham in obtaining medical evaluation. (R. 0115, 0133,
0477 ¶7.) Thereafter, Albertson’s covered Graham’s medical costs through
workers’ compensation, and gave him temporary alternative work within his
work restrictions. (R. 0115, 0133, 0477-481 ¶¶ 7-8, 013-22, 0484-0485 ¶¶ 711.)
A little more than two months later, Graham’s employment with
Albertson’s was terminated. (R. 0115.) The parties dispute the reason for
Graham’s termination.

Albertson’s contends that Graham’s termination,

which was originally initiated by Graham as a voluntary termination for
personal reasons and to focus on school, ultimately was a result of a
3

combination of factors, including various work-related incidents and
dishonesty by Graham. (R. 0289-0294 ¶¶ 9-19.) Graham contends he was
terminated for reporting his injury to Albertson’s. (R. 0007-0008.)
II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
About three months later, on June 8, 2017, Graham filed a complaint

with the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (“Division”) pursuant to
Section 203 alleging that Albertson’s had terminated him in retaliation for
reporting a work-related injury. (R. 0076.) The Division investigated Graham’s
complaint and issued an Order that the evidence did not support a finding that
Albertson’s had terminated Graham in violation of the UOSH Act. Id. On
November 6, 2017, Graham administratively appealed this Order to the Labor
Commission’s Division of Adjudication. Id. That appeal is pending.
On January 29, 2018, Shortly after he filed his administrative appeal,
Graham filed a Complaint against Albertson’s in Third District Court. (R.
0001-0014.) In his Complaint, Graham asserts a claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy based on allegations that Albertson’s terminated
him in retaliation for having reported a workplace injury to Albertson’s, in
violation of the public policy against retaliatory discharge embodied in Section

4

203.1 Id. (R. 7-8.) Shortly after Albertson’s filed its Answer and the parties
exchanged initial disclosures, Graham filed a motion for partial summary
judgment seeking a ruling that his wrongful discharge claim is not preempted
by the UOSH Act. (R. 0053-0062.) Graham also filed a declaration in support
of his motion in which he represented to the district court that “[d]ue to the
limited procedures and remedies which are available for claimants under Utah
Code §34A-6-203, I prefer to pursue the claims and remedies which are
available in the present action in lieu of my pending claims in the Utah Labor
Commission.” (R. 0075-0077, ¶ 12.) Graham further informed that court that
“[s]hould this Court decide to grant my present Motion, it is my intention to
voluntarily dismiss my proceeding in the Utah Labor Commission.” (R. 00750077, ¶ 13.)
Albertson’s opposed Graham’s motion, (R. 0114-0131), and filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgement seeking a ruling that Graham’s
wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the UOSH Act, including but not
limited to Section 203. (R. 0132-0136.) On July 30, 2018, Graham filed a
Notice of Supplemental Authority, arguing that Utah Administrative Code
R614-1-10.L.3-5 (copy attached hereto as

Addendum Item 3), reflects a

Graham’s Complaint also assert claims for purported breach of contract and
breach of the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 0009-0011.)
These claims remain pending in the district court.
1
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legislative intent that the administrative remedy established by Section 203
not be the exclusive remedy for retaliatory termination in violation of the
UOSH Act. (R. 0212-0214.) On September 21, 2018, Graham filed a Second
Notice of Supplemental Authority, in which he argued that Utah Code section
34A-6-110 (copy attached hereto as Addendum Item 2) also reflects a
legislative intent that the UOSH Act not preempt claims of wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy. (R. 0541-0542.)
On October 12, 2018, the district court entered an order ruling that
Graham’s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is preempted
by the UOSH Act, including but not limited to Section 203. (R. 0585-0589)
(copy attached hereto as Addendum Item 4.) The district court based its ruling
on both general field preemption principles (R. 0586-0587, at ¶¶ 1-5) and on
the more specialized “indispensable element” test adopted by this Court in
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949
(Utah 1992). (R. 0587-0588, at ¶ 6.)
In applying general field preemption principles, the district court ruled
that a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the UOSH
Act. (R. 0586-0587, at ¶ 3.) The district court explained that in enacting the
UOSH Act, “the legislature put in place a comprehensive piece of legislation to
provide for the safety and health of workers and provided a coordinated plan
to establish standards to do so,” including “procedures, a scheme of regulation,
6

and a bureaucratic system to implement its aims in a timely and cost-effective
approach.” Id. The district court further explained that employee retaliation
complaints to the Division “address the concerns not only of individual
employees but also the broader purpose of providing for the safety and welfare
of all workers through the broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act,” and
that allowing common-law tort claim outside the process established by the
UOSH Act “runs counter to the purpose of the UOSH Act in that it could
discourage employees from making a claim under the UOSH Act in order to
pursue broader remedies than those provided for under the UOSH Act.”
(R. 0587, at ¶5.)
In reaching its conclusion, the district court expressly noted Graham’s
argument that a non-preemptive legislative intent is indicated by Utah
Administrative Code R614-1-10.L, but rejected that argument based on a plain
reading of the rule, which on its face applies only to arbitration and other
agency proceedings. (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.) The district court did not explicitly
address the merits of Graham’s argument about Utah Code section 34A-6-110,
but it expressly acknowledged that Graham had “filed Plaintiff’s Second Notice
of Supplemental Authority,” and affirmatively stated that, in issuing its order,
it had “considered the pleadings and submissions of the parties, the arguments
of counsel, and the relevant law.” (R. 0586.)

7

The portions of the district court’s order applying field preemption
principles are referred to and quoted in Graham’s Opening Brief. Opening
Brief, at 6-7. The portion of the district court’s analysis and ruling based on
the indispensable element test, which is not set forth or even acknowledged in
Graham’s Opening Brief, is set forth below:
The Court further finds that when it analyzes plaintiff’s commonlaw claim in this action, the UOSH Act provides the public policy
supporting his common-law claim, and it establishes a procedure
and remedy to address his claim, which is retaliation or discharge
for reporting a workplace injury in violation of the UOSH Act. As
such, the Court finds that the claim at issue comes within the scope
of the UOSH Act’s preemptive effect. The Court comes to this
conclusion based on the indispensable element test set forth in
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). In applying this test, preemption depends
on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim.
Here, in Utah Code section 34A-6-203, the UOSH Act specifically
addresses retaliation or discharge as a result of reporting a
workplace injury, the very injury claimed by plaintiff in this action.
The Court finds that the UOSH Act establishes a procedure for
reporting and investigating a claim of retaliation and discharge, a
forum to issue a decision or order, a remedy, and a procedure for
review and appeal of that order. Further, in claiming discharge in
violation of public policy in his tort claim, plaintiff relies on the
UOSH Act as the statement of public policy. In the absence of the
UOSH Act, plaintiff would be unable to make out his common-law
claim. As such, the Court finds that the harm the UOSH Act
addresses is an indispensable element of plaintiff’s tort cause of
action and, therefore, the UOSH Act preempts plaintiff’s commonlaw claim here.
(R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)

8

On October 2, 2018, Graham filed a Motion to Certify Ruling Pursuant
to Rule 54(b).

(R. 5046-0552.)

The district court denied that Motion on

December 17, 2018. (R. 0679-0681.)
On November 1, 2018, Graham filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal
with this Court. (R. 0620-0634.) On December 26, 2018, this Court granted
that Petition. (R. 0794.)
On December 7, 2018, Graham filed a Motion for Leave to Amend
Complaint. (R. 0642-0648.) Among other things, Graham sought to amend his
Complaint to assert a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
based on allegations that Albertson’s retaliated against him, including
terminating his employment, not for exercising a right under the UOSH Act,
but “for claiming and receiving workers’ compensation benefits . . . .” (R. 06420643.) Albertson’s opposed Graham’s Motion to Amend as untimely without
any justification offered for delay, as unduly prejudicial, and as an attempted
end run around the district court’s dismissal of his wrongful discharge claim
based on the UOSH Act. (R. 0684-0791.)
On December 27, 2018, Graham filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings
Pending Decision on Appeal.

The district court granted that motion on

February 4, 2019.2

As a result, Graham’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint remains pending
in the action below.
2
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III.

DISPOSITION BELOW

On October 12, 2018, the district court entered an order ruling that
Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the UOSH Act, including
but not limited to Section 203. (R. 0585-0589.) Accordingly, the district court
denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granted
Albertson’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dismissing
Graham’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
As noted above, on December 26, 2018, this Court granted Graham’s
Petition for Permission to Appeal. (R. 7094.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court correctly ruled that Graham’s wrongful discharge
claim is preempted by the UOSH Act under the indispensable element test.
The indispensable element test was adopted by this Court in Retherford v.
AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., as “the correct analytical
model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses a common
law remedy.” 844 P.2d 949, 963 (Utah 1992). Under this test, preemption
depends on ‘“the nature of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim,
not the nature of the defendant’s act which the plaintiff alleges to have been
responsible for that injury.”’” Id. at 965 (citations omitted). The indispensable
element test has two prongs. Under the first prong, a court determines the
nature of the injury the statute in question is designed to address. Under the
10

second prong, a court determines whether the injury the relevant statute is
designed to address supplies an indispensable element of the cause of action
being examined. Id. at 965-966. If it does, that cause of action is preempted.
Id. at 966.
In this case, the district court properly applied the indispensable element
test and held that Graham’s wrongful discharge claim is preempted by the
UOSH Act. The district court first correctly determined that the nature of the
injury that the UOSH Act is designed to address is “retaliation or discharge as
a result of reporting a workplace injury, the very injury claimed by [Graham]
in this action.”

(R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)

The district court next correctly

determined that discharge in retaliation for reporting a workplace injury is an
indispensable element of Graham’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy. Id. To prove his claim, Graham must prove that his alleged
discharge contravenes a “clear and substantial public policy” of the State of
Utah. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 966. The district court noted that “in claiming
discharge in violation of public policy . . . , [Graham] relies on the UOSH Act
as the statement of public policy. In the absence of the UOSH Act, plaintiff
would be unable to make out his common-law claim.” (R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)
According, the district court properly concluded that “the harm the UOSH Act
addresses is an indispensable element of [Graham’s] tort cause of action and,
therefore, the UOSH Act preempts [Graham’s] common-law claim here.” Id.
11

The district court also correctly ruled that Graham’s wrongful discharge
claim is preempted under the more generally applicable field preemption
analysis applied by this Court in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and
Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002 UT 95. The district court first correctly
noted that although the UOSH Act does not contain an express exclusive
remedy provision, “a preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose
of the UOSH Act.” (R. 0587, at ¶ 3.) The purpose of the UOSH Act is to “put
in place a comprehensive piece of legislation to provide for the safety and
health of workers and provide[] a coordinated plan to establish standards to do
so.” Id. To further that purpose, “[t]he UOSH Act establishes standards,
procedures, a scheme of regulation, and a bureaucratic system to implement
its aims in a timely and cost-effective approach.” Id.
The district court further found that allowing Graham’s wrongful
discharge claim could stand as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of
the full purpose and objectives of the UOSH Act. (R. 0587, at ¶ 5.) The district
court explained that allowing a wrongful discharge claim for retaliatory
termination under the UOSH Act “could discourage employees from making a
claim under the UOSH Act in order to pursue broader remedies than those
provided for under the UOSH Act, and that claims under the UOSH Act
address the concerns not only of individual employees but also the broader
purpose of providing for the safety and welfare of all workers through the
12

broader regulatory structure of the UOSH Act.” Id. This conclusion is a matter
of common sense, and is further supported in this case by Graham’s own
representations to the district court that he desired to pursue his wrongful
discharge claim over an administrative claim under the UOSH Act because he
“prefer[s] . . . the claims and remedies which are available in [tort]” over those
available under the UOSH Act, and that if the district court permitted him to
do so, it was his intention to voluntarily dismiss his pending administrative
proceeding. (Declaration of Steven Eric Graham, R. 0075-0077, ¶¶ 12-13.)
Discouraging employees from filing complaints with the Division could impede
the Division’s ability to execute the full purpose and objectives of UOSH Act
because it would decrease information coming to the Division about conduct
potentially indicative of unsafe or unhealthy workplaces or that interferes with
Division’s ability to perform its statutory mandates of conducting workplace
inspections and investigating worker injuries, Utah Code § 34A-6-301;
enforcing rules requiring employers to report workplace injuries to the
Division, id.; issuing citations for violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petitioning
district courts to restrain dangerous workplace conditions or practices. Id. §
34A-6-305.
Graham’s arguments against field preemption are without merit.
Graham argues that the district court “failed to allocate the burden of proof to
[Albertson’s]” because the district court’s order does not expressly recite that
13

Albertson’s had the burden of proof in establishing preemption. Opening Brief
at 11-12. Yet it is clear from the face of the district court’s order and the
memoranda submitted by Albertson’s in connection with the parties’ crossmotions for partial summary judgment that Albertson’s met its burden of proof,
as each of the grounds relied on by the district court were argued by
Albertson’s. Graham also argues that the district court’s ruling “is based upon
an unsupported factual assumption that workers will forego an administrative
claim under the UOSH Act to pursue their common law remedy.” Opening
Brief at 16. But, as noted above, the conclusion that allowing persons to pursue
tort claims with more generous available damages and a longer limitations
period would discourage at least some of them from making administrative
complaints to the Division is not only a matter of common sense, it is supported
by Graham’s own stated intent in this case.
Graham’s argument that the district court did not properly consider his
“evidence” against preemption is likewise without merit. Opening Brief at 1721. In its order, the district court expressly discussed the administrative rule
cited by Graham in his first Notice of Supplemental Authority and found it
inapplicable on its face. (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.) And, while the district court’s order
does not discuss the statutory provision cited by Graham in his Second Notice
of Supplemental Authority, it explicitly refers to that Second Notice of
Supplemental Authority and expressly states that the district court considered
14

all of the parties’ submissions in arriving at its ruling. (R. 0586.) Further, like
the administrative rule cited by Graham, the statutory provision he cites is
inapplicable on its face. The language and context of that statutory provision
shows that it was intended to preserve existing law relating to physical or
mental injuries on the job.
Finally, Graham’s argument that the limited remedies available under
Section 203 “establish an inference against pre-emption” also fails.

See

Opening Brief at 22. Graham does not support this argument with citation to
any supporting legal authority, and Utah law on preemption is decidedly to the
contrary. Indeed, this Court found the common law claims in both Retherford
and Gottling were preempted notwithstanding that the remedies under the
relevant statute were limited (in the case of Retherford) or not available at all
(in the case of Gottling).
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT GRAHAM’S
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY IS PREEMPTED BY THE UOSH ACT.
The district court correctly ruled that Graham’s claim for wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy based on the UOSH Act is preempted by
the UOSH Act under both general field preemption principles and under the
indispensable element test set forth in Retherford v. AT&T Communications
of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). Because the indispensable
15

element test governs in this case and is dispositive of Graham’s claim, it is
addressed first below.
A.

Graham’s Claim Is Preempted Under the “Indispensable
Element” Test Adopted by Retherford.

In his Opening Brief, Graham omits to mention the district court’s ruling
that his wrongful discharge claim is preempted under the indispensable
element test adopted by this Court in Retherford v. AT&T Communications of
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992).3 However, in Retherford, this
Court squarely held “that the indispensable element test is the correct
analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of action forecloses
a common law remedy.” Id. at 963. This is the precise determination made by
the district court in this case and the precise question presented in this appeal.
In Retherford, the plaintiff claimed her former employer terminated her
in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. Id. at 957. Rather than
filing an administrative charge of discrimination under the Utah AntiDiscrimination Act (“UADA”), Retherford sued her former employer for
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because “she hope[d] to avoid

This Court should affirm the district court’s ruling for this reason alone. See
Roach v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 74 Utah 545, 280 P.2d 1053, 1055 (1929)
(“It is well settled in this jurisdiction that questions not assigned, or, though
assigned, but not briefed or discussed, will not be considered.”); iDrive
Logistics, LLC v. Integracore LLC, 2018 UT App. 40, ¶ 76 (appellate court
rejects challenge to district court ruling where the appellant fails to address in
its arguments on appeal the basis of the district court’s ruling).
3
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[the UADA’s] provisions and pursue her common law remedies. . . .” 4 Id. at
961. Her former employer moved to dismiss this claim on the ground, among
others, that it was preempted by the UADA (and Title VII). The trial court
converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment, and granted it.
In reviewing the trial court’s dismissal of this claim, the question as
framed by the Retherford Court was, “Does the [UADA’s] exclusive remedy
provision preempt common law causes of action based on the same facts
necessary to prove a cause of action under the statute, including common law
causes of action for discharge in violation of public policy[?]” Id. at 959. After
examining different approaches used by courts in other jurisdictions to answer
such a question, the Retherford Court held “that the indispensable element test
is the correct analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of
action forecloses a common law remedy.” Id. at 963.
The “indispensable element test” requires a court to “begin with the task
of determining what injuries [the statute] is designed to address,” and then
take “the next step … to determine whether [those injuries supply] an
indispensable element of any of [the plaintiff’s] causes of action.” Id. at 965-

66. If they do, the claim is preempted. Id.

This is precisely what Graham admits he seeks to do in this case. (R. 00750077, ¶¶ 12- 13.)

4
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Applying this test to Retherford’s public policy claim, this Court first
concluded that the UADA was designed, among other things, to address “all
manner of employment discrimination,” including retaliation. Id. Having
made this determination, this Court next queried whether “employer
retaliation supplies an indispensable element of” Retherford’s public policy
claim. Id. This Court answered that question in affirmative, and held that
that Retherford’s public policy claim was preempted. This Court explained as
follows:
The only possible source in Utah’s statutes or constitution for a
clear and substantial public policy allegedly violated by
Retherford’s discharge is the UADA’s prohibition of retaliation for
good faith complaints of employment discrimination. . . . [W]e find
that in the absence of this public policy declaration, Retherford
would be unable to allege an action for this tort. Simply put, if
there were no UADA policy against retaliation, there could
be no tort for discharge in violation of this public policy.

Id. (emphasis added).
Graham’s public policy claim is materially indistinguishable from the
public policy claim in Retherford. The plain purpose of Section 203, on which
Graham relies for a public policy, is to prohibit retaliation against an employee
who exercises a right under the UOSH Act.5 In other words, under the first

5

In relevant part, Section 203 provides as follows:

(1) A person may not discharge or in any way retaliate against
an employee because the employee:
...
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prong of the indispensable element test, retaliation for exercising a right under
the UOSH Act is the injury Section 203 was designed to address. Further,
under the second prong of the indispensable element test (and just as in
Retherford), retaliation is an indispensable element of Graham’s wrongful
discharge claim.

The only possible statutory source for the public policy

against retaliation that Graham advocates is Section 203. In the absence of
Section 203’s prohibition against retaliation, Graham would not even be able
to allege a public policy claim. “Simply put, if there were no [UOSH Act] policy
against retaliation, there could be no tort for discharge in violation of public
policy.” Retherford, 844 P.2d at 996.
Thus, under the indispensable element test, the UOSH Act preempts
Graham’s public policy claim. See also Johnson v. E. A. Miller, Inc., 172 F.3d
62 (10th Cir. Feb 25, 1999) (unpublished), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1004 (1999)
(dismissing common law wrongful discharge claims as preempted by Section
203 and the UADA, stating: “[A]ny ‘public policy’ actions which are based on a
statutory cause of action are preempted.”) The district court correctly applied
the indispensable element test to this case, ruling as follows:
The Court further finds that when it analyzes plaintiff’s commonlaw claim in this action, the UOSH Act provides the public policy
(c) exercises a right granted by this chapter on behalf of the
employee or others.
Utah Code § 34A-6-203(1).
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supporting his common-law claim, and it establishes a procedure
and remedy to address his claim, which is retaliation or discharge
for reporting a workplace injury in violation of the UOSH Act. As
such, the Court finds that the claim at issue comes within the scope
of the UOSH Act’s preemptive effect. The Court comes to this
conclusion based on the indispensable element test set forth in
Retherford v. AT&T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844
P.2d 949 (Utah 1992). In applying this test, preemption depends
on the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff makes the claim.
Here, in Utah Code section 34A-6-203, the UOSH Act specifically
addresses retaliation or discharge as a result of reporting a
workplace injury, the very injury claimed by plaintiff in this action.
The Court finds that the UOSH Act establishes a procedure for
reporting and investigating a claim of retaliation and discharge, a
forum to issue a decision or order, a remedy, and a procedure for
review and appeal of that order. Further, in claiming discharge in
violation of public policy in his tort claim, plaintiff relies on the
UOSH Act as the statement of public policy. In the absence of the
UOSH Act, plaintiff would be unable to make out his common-law
claim. As such, the Court finds that the harm the UOSH Act
addresses is an indispensable element of plaintiff’s tort cause of
action and, therefore, the UOSH Act preempts plaintiff’s commonlaw claim here.
(R. 0587-0588, at ¶6.)
This Court should affirm the district court’s order.
B.

The District Court Also Correctly Ruled that Graham’s
Claim Is Preempted by the UOSH Act Under the Doctrine
of Field Preemption.

Even if this case were not governed by Retherford, which it is, it would
still fail as a matter of law because, as the district court also correctly observed,
the purpose and structure of the UOSH Act demonstrate the Utah legislature’s
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intent to preempt the field of law applying to claims of discharge in retaliation
for exercising a right under the UOSH Act.6
1.

The UOSH Act Creates a Scheme of Statutory
Regulation so Pervasive as to Make Reasonable an
Inference of Preemptive Intent as to Conduct
Explicitly Addressed by the UOSH Act.

This Court first addressed “field preemption” in Gilger v. Hernandez,
2000 UT 23.

In Gilger, this Court was asked to decide whether Utah’s

Dramshop Act preempted a common law negligence claim against a social host

That the indispensable element test of Retherford governs in this case is made
further clear by this Court’s description of this test in its subsequent decisions
in Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, and Gottling v. P.R. Incorporated, 2002
UT 95. In Gilger, this Court explained that the indispensable element test
6

applies to a specific type of preemption: where the statute at issue
offers a remedy for a specific type of injury caused by an act of the
defendant and where the asserted common law causes of action,
while based on the same facts, offer a remedy for a potentially
different injury based on those same facts. In such situations, we
have held that the intent to preempt is determined by “the nature
of the injury for which [the] plaintiff makes [the] claim, not the
nature of the defendant’s act which the plaintiff alleges to have
been responsible for that injury.” (internal citations omitted).
Gilger, 2000 UT 23, ¶ 10. The Gilger Court further explained that it did not
face that narrow type of preemption claim in the case before it, as the
Dramshop Act did not offer a statutory remedy to the plaintiff in that case;
therefore, Retherford was inapplicable, “although it remains fully
appropriate in situations for which it was designed.” Id. (emphasis
added). In Gottling, this Court again distinguished Retherford on like grounds,
and reaffirmed its applicability to cases involving a determination whether a
statutory cause of action forecloses a common law remedy. 2002 UT 95, ¶ 9, n.1.
As noted above, this case presents the same situation as Retherford, because
the UOSH Act offers a remedy for the precise injury for which Graham seeks
to recover through a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge.
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who supplied beer, rather than liquor, to a minor guest who then stabbed
another guest. This Court found that although the Dramshop Act did not have
an express preemption provision, and did not apply to a social host who
supplied beer (as opposed to liquor) to a minor, it nonetheless preempted a
negligence claim because that Act preempted the entire field of negligence
liability for the supply of alcohol to one who then causes harm. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.
This Court found evidence of the Dramshop Act’s preemptive intent in the fact
that, “The Act evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability for liquor
providers. Its very comprehensiveness suggests a purpose and intent to
preempt inconsistent common law.”

Id. at ¶ 12.

This Court further

commented,
Although the matter is not without doubt, it appears on balance
that the policy reflected in the careful legislative designations of
those liable and those not liable under the Act cannot coexist with
the imposition by courts of different standards of care and damage
exposure for some of those the legislature has decided should not
be liable under the Act. We conclude that the common law of
negligence is preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts
that the Dramshop Act reaches. Therefore, plaintiffs’ common law
negligence liability claims based on Hernandez’s serving alcohol to
the minor Martinez, conduct covered by the Act, were properly
dismissed.
Id. at ¶ 13.
Two years later, this Court again addressed field preemption in Gottling
v. P.R. Incorporated, and concluded that the UADA was intended to preempt
the field of employment discrimination claims, including claims against
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employers too small to be covered by the UADA even though this conclusion
left the plaintiff without any remedy. 2002 UT 95, ¶¶ 9-13. In reaching this
conclusion, the Gottling Court explained that the question was “if the
legislature, with its broad law-making power, intended to exercise that power
and to occupy the field in such a way as to exclude the contemporaneous
application and development of the common law.” Id. at ¶ 8 (quoting Gilger,
2000 UT 23, at ¶ 11). In answering this question, a court should first look for
language in the statute that reveals an explicit intent to preempt common law.
If such language is not present, then a court should examine the statute’s
structure and purpose to determine if they reveal a clear, but implicit,
preemptive intent. Id. Examining the UADA, the Gottling Court found an
explicit intent to preempt the common law in the UADA’s exclusive-remedy
provision. Id. at ¶ 9. The Gottling Court went further, however, and noted
that its conclusion would be the same even in the absence of such language,
based on its structure and purpose. The Gottling Court explained,
Even if the UADA lacked an explicit statement of preemptive
intent, our holding that it preempts common law remedies for
employment discrimination would not change because a clear
preemptive intent can be implied from the statute’s structure and
purpose. The UADA was designed “to prohibit discrimination in
employment,” and it utilizes a variety of tools to accomplish that
goal. Not only does it create an administrative remedy for those
alleging to have been discriminated against by large employers,
the UADA also provides a remedy to those discriminated against
by employment agencies, labor organizations, and persons who
aid, incite, compel, or coerce to commit “discriminatory or
23

prohibited employment practices.” In addition, the UADA “creates
a substantial bureaucratic system to implement its aims.” It
establishes both the Utah Division of Anti–Discrimination and
Labor and the Utah Anti–Discrimination and Advisory Council. It
delegates the power to receive, investigate, and pass upon
complaints. It directs that the “existence, character, causes, and
extent of” employment discrimination be investigated and studied.
It provides for the formulation of plans for elimination of
discrimination, the issuance of publications designed to promote
good will and eliminate discrimination, and the proposal of
legislation designed to eliminate discrimination. “Clearly, the
legislature believed the Act’s purposes were to have broad and
important implications for the welfare of the Utah Workers.” Such
a detailed and far-reaching approach to the problem of
discrimination, encompassing a wide variety of methods, clearly
manifests the legislature’s intent to completely blanket the field of
employment law in Utah.
Id. at ¶ 12 (internal citations omitted).
The Gottling Court also found preemptive intent in the UADA’s creation
of “an elaborate remedial process,” which required an employee alleging
discrimination to assert a claim with the Antidiscrimination and Labor
Division (“UALD”) within a set time period; provided for administrative
handling of the claim, with the UALD attempting settlement and, if
unsuccessful, investigating the claim; and provided for an award of specified
(and limited) remedies to a successful complainant–all of which is performed
without charge to a complainant. Id. ¶ 13.
Like the statutes in Gilger and Gottling, the UOSH Act also has a field
preemptive effect with respect to “conduct covered by the Act . . . .” See Gilger,
2000 UT 23, at ¶ 13; Gottling, 2000 UT 23, at ¶ 11. In particular, a clear
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preemptive intent can be implied from the UOSH Act’s structure and purpose.
The stated legislative intent of the UOSH Act is “(1) to preserve human
resources by providing for the safety and health of workers; and (2) to provide
a coordinated state plan to implement, establish, and enforce occupational
safety and health standards as effective as the standards under the WilliamsSteiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 651 et seq.”
Utah Code § 34A-6-102 (emphasis added).
Also like the UADA, the UOSH Act “utilizes a variety of tools to
accomplish [its] goal.” Gottling, 2002 UT 95, ¶ 12. The UOSH Act vests
jurisdiction in the Utah Labor Commission and the Division to administer the
UOSH Act and to establish rules and provisions to carry it into effect.
Id. § 34A-6-104. It also directs the Division to conduct research and related
activities, id. § 34A-6-107; collect and analyze occupational safety statistics, id.
§ 34A-6-108; and conduct educational programs. Id. § 34A-6-109. It further
directs the Division to issue standards for workplace safety requirements, id.
§ 34A-6-202; and directs employers to comply with those standards, as well as
rules and orders issued by the Division. In addition, the UOSH Act directs the
Division to inspect workplaces and investigate worker injuries, id. § 34A-6-301;
issue rules requiring employers to report workplace injuries to the Division,
id.; issue citations for violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petition district courts to
restrain dangerous workplace conditions or practices. Id. § 34A-6-305.
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In furtherance of the UOSH Act’s stated purpose and its comprehensive
statutory scheme, Section 203 prohibits employers from discharging or
retaliating against employees for filing complaints with the Division,
participating in proceedings under the UOSH Act, or exercising a right under
the UOSH Act. Utah Code § 34A-6-203(1) . And like the UADA, the UOSH
Act creates “an elaborate remedial process,” see Gottling, 2002 UT 95, at ¶ 13,
which requires an employee alleging retaliation to make a complaint to the
Division within a set period (30 days) of an alleged retaliatory act; requires the
Division to cause an investigation to be made; and requires the Division, if it
finds unlawful retaliation, to issue an order finding a violation of Section 203,
requiring that the violation cease, and (permissively) including “other
appropriate relief, such as reinstatement of the employee to the employee's
former position with back pay.” Id. § 34A-6-203(2)(c)(i). Either an employer
or employee may appeal an order of the Division, first administratively, and
then judicially. Id. § 34A-6-203(3)(4).
Thus, just as the Utah Dramshop Act in Gilger covered the field of
negligence-based liability for social hosts providing alcohol, and the UADA in
Gottling covered the field of employer discrimination, the UOSH Act covers the
field of employee retaliation claims. In addition to providing for comprehensive
safety and health standards, research, and public education, the UOSH Act
expressly prohibits retaliation against employees for exercising rights under
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the UOSH Act, and adopts detailed provisions to enforce its prohibition,
complete with a specified time period, administrative processing and
investigation of complaints, limitations on the damages and penalties that a
claimant can recover, and an elaborate administrative and judicial appeals
process—and does so without cost to a complainant. Accordingly, the district
court correctly concluded that in adopting the UOSH Act, the Utah legislature
intended to preempt the field that includes claims of retaliation discharge
specifically addressed by the UOSH Act. This Court should not permit Graham
to make an “end-run” around the UOSH Act through pursuit of a common law
public policy claim, but should affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim
with prejudice.
2.

The District Court Properly Concluded that
Permitting Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims
for Conduct Addressed by the UOSH Act Would Stand
as an Obstacle to the Accomplishment and Execution
of the Full Purpose and Objectives of the UOSH Act.

Field preemption is also established when a common-law cause of action
“may stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purpose and objectives” of a statutory enactment. See Gottling, 2002 UT 95,

at ¶ 8 (quoting Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶ 11 (quoting Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31, 116 S. Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996))).
In this case, the district court concluded that permitting wrongful discharge
claims for conduct explicitly covered by Section 204 would stand as an obstacle
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to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of the
UOSH Act because it would discourage employees from making administrative
claims of retaliatory discharge to the Division in order to pursue broader
remedies in court. This conclusion was proper and should be affirmed.
As articulated by the Division in its administrative rule implementing
Section 203, “Enforcement of the provisions of Section 34A-6-203 is not only a
matter of protecting rights of individual employees, but also of public interest.”
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.K.

These interests include the Division’s

statutory mandate to enforce the provisions of the UOSH Act, including
Section 203. Accordingly, a request by an employee to withdraw a complaint
of retaliation filed with the Division “will not necessarily result in termination
of the Administrator's investigation. The Administrator’s jurisdiction cannot
be foreclosed as a matter of law by unilateral action of the employee.” Id.
These interests also include the ability of the Division to conduct workplace
inspections and related investigations unfettered by retaliatory conduct by
employers. See Utah Code §§ 34A-6-104, 34A-6-301. These interests are
furthered when the Division receives timely complaints from employees of
alleged retaliatory termination or other retaliatory conduct. Accordingly, the
UOSH Act requires that complaints of retaliation by employees be made to the
Division, and that they be made within 30 days after the retaliatory action. Id.
§ 34A-6-203(2)(a).

These requirements allow the Division to investigate
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potentially retaliatory conduct promptly and before they become stale, see
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.I.4.b., as well as to detect, remedy, and deter
conduct that may thwart or impair Division inspections, investigations, and
enforcement actions.
If claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy for alleged
retaliation in violation of the UOSH Act were permitted, some employees
subjected to such retaliation would undoubtedly skip making administrative
complaints of retaliation to the Division and proceed directly to court to pursue
their individual interests in obtaining broader remedies than those provided
by the legislature. Furthermore, some would inevitably do so long after the
30-day period set by the legislature for complaints of retaliatory termination—
potentially up to four years after the fact. See Utah Code § 78B-2-307. Not
only would this be inconsistent with the legislatively determined forms of relief
available to successful employees, it would impede the Division’s ability to
execute the full purpose and objectives of UOSH Act because it would decrease
information coming to the Division about conduct potentially indicative of
unsafe or unhealthy workplaces or that interferes with Division’s ability to
perform its statutory mandates of conducting workplace inspections and
investigating worker injuries, id. § 34A-6-301; enforcing rules requiring
employers to report workplace injuries to the Division, id.; issuing citations for
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violations, id. § 34A-6-302; and petitioning district courts to restrain dangerous
workplace conditions or practices. Id. § 34A-6-305.
3.

Graham’s Arguments that the District Court Wrongly
Found Field Preemption in this Case Are Without
Merit.

Graham makes three arguments against the district court’s preemption
ruling in this Case. First, he argues that the district court did not apply the
appropriate legal standards in this case. Opening Brief at 11-17. Second, he
argues that the district court did not properly consider his “evidence” against
preemption. Id. at 17-21. And third, he argues that the limited remedies under
Section 203 establish an inference against preemption.

Id. at 22-24. As set

forth below, each of these arguments is without merit.
a.

The District Court Applied the Appropriate Legal
Standards in This Case.

Graham argues that the district court “failed to allocate the burden of
proof to [Albertson’s]” and that “it did not find a ‘clear and manifest purpose’
on the part of the Legislature to pre-empt Mr. Graham’s claims.” Opening
Brief at 15. In support of this argument, Graham notes that “the district
court's order provides no express reference to the burden of proof relating to
[Albertson’s] pre-emption defense,” id. at 11-12; and asserts that under State

v. Jones, 958 P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1998), “pre-emption occurs only where
there is a ‘clear and manifest’ to pre-empt expressed by the statutory language
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or by implication from the statutory structure and purpose.” Id at 13-14 (citing
Jones, 958 P.2d 938 (Utah App. 1998)). Graham also cites to Wintergreen
Group, LC v. Utah Dep't of Transportation, 2007 UT 75, for the proposition
that “a legislative intent to pre-empt may not be inferred merely from the
comprehensiveness of a statute.” Id at 14-15.
Graham is correct that the district court's order does not expressly refer
to the burden of proof for establishing preemption. The lack of any such
explicit reference does not, of course, mean the district court failed to allocate
the burden of proof to Albertson’s on this issue. Indeed, it is evident from the
face of the district court’s order that Albertson’s met its burden of proof on this
issue. In its order, the district court found “that a preemptive intent is implied
by the structure and purpose of the UOSH Act,” which includes the express
statutory purpose of the UOSH Act, the comprehensiveness of the UOSH Act,
and the procedures, scheme of regulation, and bureaucratic system created by
the UOSH Act to implement its purpose.7 (R. 0587-0587, at ¶ 3.) These precise
considerations were presented to the district court by Albertson’s in its
opposition to Graham’s motion for partial summary judgment (see R. 01200122, 0127-0129) and in its cross-motion for partial summary judgment. (See

Moreover, as set forth in Section I.A., supra, the District Court expressly found
Graham’s claim to be preempted by Section 203 of the UOSH Act under the
indispensable element test, which governs in this case. (See R. 0587-9588, at ¶ 6.)

7
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R. 0133-0135, 0162-0166.) Similarly, it is of no moment that the district court’s
order does not recite that it found the preemptive intent of the legislature to
be “clear and manifest,” as such a conclusion follows from the district court’s
analysis of the UOSH Act.
Graham’s reliance on Wintergreen Group, LC v. Utah Dep't of
Transportation for the proposition that a legislative intent to pre-empt may
not be inferred merely from the comprehensiveness of a statute is misplaced.
See Opening Brief at 14-15. Indeed, Wintergreen Group reversed a trial court’s
dismissal of constitutional counterclaim because the notion of preemption was
not conceptually viable in the setting of that case because the case involved “a
direct clash between a statute and [a] constitutional claim,” rather than a clash
between two statutes or a statute and a non-constitutional common law claim.
2007 UT 75, at ¶ 15. As this Court explained in Wintergreen Group, “Owing
to its different lineage, a constitutional cause of action can never be preempted
by statute . . . .” Id. at ¶ 14.8 Thus, Wintergreen Group is inapplicable and
does not affect the district court’s order.

Separately, for the sake of accuracy, Albertson’s notes that Wintergreen
Group does not state what Graham paraphrases it as stating. Rather, in dicta
discussing the conditions necessary to “extinguish a § 1983 claim … based on
an underlying constitutional right,” Wintergreen Group states that, in that
particular context, “the presence of a comprehensive statutory scheme, by
itself, ‘is not necessarily sufficient to demonstrate that Congress intended to
foreclose a § 1983 remedy.’” Id. 2007 UT 75, at ¶ 15.
8
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Last, Graham argues that the district court’s conclusion “is based upon
an unsupported factual assumption that workers will forego an administrative
claim under the UOSH Act to pursue their common law remedy.” Opening
Brief at 16.

This argument also is without merit.

The district court’s

conclusion is not based on “an unsupported factual assumption,” but on
common sense. And, to the extent the district court’s conclusion required
anything more from a factual standpoint, it had facts before it (ironically
supplied by Graham himself) that supported that conclusion. These facts came
in the form of Graham’s own declaration submitted in support of his motion for
partial summary judgment, in which Graham represented to the district court
that his own preference was to pursue a wrongful discharge claim in this case
over his administrative complaint because of the broader remedies available
under a tort cause of action than provided by the legislature in an
administrative complaint under Section 203. (R. 0075-0077, at ¶¶ 12, 13.)
Graham’s arguments that the district court applied the wrong legal standards
in this case are without merit, and the district court’s order should be affirmed.
b.

Graham’s Argument that the District Court Did Not
Properly Consider His “Evidence” Against Preemption
Is Without Merit.

Graham argues in his Opening Brief that the district court did not
properly consider his “evidence” against preemption. Opening Brief at 17-21.
Specifically, Graham argues that the district court failed to consider his
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arguments that Utah Code section 34A-6-110 and Utah Administrative Code
R614-1-10.L evidence a legislative intent against preemption of his wrongful
discharge action. This argument is also without merit.
Graham’s argument that the district court did not consider Utah Code
section 34A-6-110 is based solely on the fact that the district court’s order
“contains no reference to [that statutory provision].” Opening Brief at 18. Of
course, the mere fact that the district court did not cite section 34A-6-110 or
explicitly address the merits of Graham’s argument about that section does not
mean the district court did not consider it. To the contrary, in its order, the
district court’s expressly acknowledges that Graham had “filed Plaintiff’s
Second Notice of Supplemental Authority,” in which he presented his
argument about section 34A-6-110, and then affirmatively states that in
issuing its ruling, the district court’s “considered the pleadings and
submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant law.”
(R. 0586.)
In any event, Graham cited no legal authority in his Second Notice of
Supplemental Authority in support of the contention that section 110 indicates
a legislative intent against the preemption of claims for wrongful termination
based on alleged violations of Section 203. Similarly, Graham, cites to no such
authority in his Opening Brief in this appeal. Furthermore, section 34A-6-110
is inapplicable on its face to Graham’s wrongful discharge claim. The heading
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of section 34A-6-110 reads, “Requirements of other laws not limited or
repealed–Worker’s Compensation or rights under other laws with respect
to employment injuries not affected.” Utah Code § 34A-6-110 (emphasis
added). Subsection (2) of section 34A-6-110 provides, in turn, as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to supersede or
in any manner affect workers’ compensation or enlarge or
diminish or affect the common law or statutory rights, duties, or
liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect
to injuries, occupational or other diseases, or death of
employees arising out of, or in the course of employment.

Id. § 34A-6-110(2) (emphasis added). The plain language of section 34A-6110 indicates that it was intended to prevent anything within the UOSH Act
from disturbing the then-existing elaborate body of statutory and common law
relating to the rights of employees, employers, and third parties for injuries,
diseases, or death of employees arising out of or in the course of employment.
Context demonstrates that the term “injuries” in this provision refers to
physical or mental injuries on the job. This context includes the provision’s
express references to “workers’ compensation,” “employers and employees,”
and “injuries, occupational, or other diseases, or death of employees.” Id. It is
further demonstrated by the limiting phrase “arising out of, or in the course of
employment,” which was (and still is) an established term of art used (with
minor variations over the years) in the Utah Workers’ Compensation Act and
the construed by numerous judicial decisions as of 1973, when the UOSH Act
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was enacted. See, e.g., M & K Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 189 P.2d 132, 133–34
(Utah 1948) (construing term “arising out of or in the course of employment”
as used in then-section 42–1–43 (1943)); Andreason v. Indus. Comm’n, 100
P.2d 202, 204 (Utah 1940), reh’g denied, 102 P.2d 894 (construing same term,
as used in then-Utah Code §§ 42-1-42, 42-1-43 (1933)); Chase v. Indus.
Comm’n, 17 P.2d 205 (Utah 1932) (construing same term, as used in Laws
Utah 1921, chap. 67, § 3112); Grasteit v. Indus. Comm’n, 290 P. 764, 768 (Utah
1930) (discussing same term, as used in Comp. Laws 1917, § 3112, as
amended); Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n, 245 P. 343 (Utah
1926) (same); Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 208 P. 494 (Utah 1922) (same);
Pinyon Queen Mining Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 204 P. 323 (1922) (same). And, as
more recently decided by this Court in Touchard v. La-Z Boy Inc., the
termination of an employee’s employment does not fall within the scope of this
term. 2006 UT 71, ¶ 24 (holding that cause of action for wrongful discharge
does not fall within the exclusive remedy provision of the Utah Workers’
Compensation Act).
Graham’s assertion that the district court did not properly consider his
argument under Utah Administrative Code R614-1-10.L is similarly without
merit. Indeed, the district court not only considered this argument, it explicitly
rejected it because the court’s “reading of that provision is that it applies to
arbitration and other agency proceedings, and it does not change the Court’s
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reading of the UOSH Act as it relates to a common-law tort claim, such as the
one at issue here.” (R. 0587, at ¶ 4.) Further, the district court’s reading of
R614-1-10.L is correct. R614-1-10.L, captioned “Arbitration or other agency
proceedings” acknowledges the reality that, concurrently with filing a
complaint under Section 203, an employee may also pursue remedies “under
grievance arbitration proceedings in collective bargaining agreements” or may
resort to “other agencies” for relief, “such as the National Labor Relations
Board.” See Utah Admin. Code R614-1-10.L.1. The rule further states the
principles used by the Division in such circumstances to balance the exercise
of its independent jurisdiction to investigate and determine Section 203
complaints with the policy favoring voluntary resolution of disputes “under
procedures in collective bargaining agreements” and the principle of paying
due deference to the jurisdiction of “other agencies,” established to resolve
disputes that may also be related to Section 203 complaints. Id. R614-1-10.L.2.
Nothing in the rule indicates that it applies to the pursuit of tort claims in
private civil lawsuits. Separately, as R614-1-10.L is an administrative rule
issued by an administrative agency, and not a statute or other pronouncement
by the legislature, it provides no evidence of legislative intent. Accordingly,
the district court properly rejected R614-1-10.L as “evidence” of legislative
intent that the UOSH Act not preempt private causes of action based on
conduct expressly addressed by Section 203.
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c.

Graham’s Contention that the Limited Remedies
Under Section 203 Establish an Inference Against PreEmption Is Incorrect.

Graham’s final argument on appeal is that the limited remedies
available under Section 203 “establish an inference against pre-emption.”
Opening Brief at 22. Notably, Graham does not cite any legal authority in
support of this argument. This is understandable, as Utah law on preemption
is decidedly to the contrary and makes clear that the extent of the remedies
available under a statute (or whether a statutory remedy is available at all) is
relevant only to a determination of which test of statutory preemption applies,
not to whether a statute preempts a common-law cause of action. In those
situations where a statute supplies a remedy, “the indispensable element test
is the correct analytical model for determining whether a statutory cause of
action forecloses a common law remedy.” Retherford, 844 P.2d at 963. In
other situations, the broader field preemption test applied by this Court in
Gilger and Gottling applies. See Gilger, 2000 UT 23, at ¶¶ 9-11; Gottling, 2002
UT 95, ¶¶ 9-13.
In either situation, if the requirements of the applicable test are met, a
common law remedy is preempted regardless of whether the result leaves a
particular plaintiff with a lesser remedy—or none at all. As made clear by
Retherford, in the situation where a statute provides a remedy, if the
requirements of the indispensable element test are met, a common law claim
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is preempted without regard to whether the statutory remedy is as generous
than an argued-for common law remedy. That was the precise situation in
Retherford, where the recovery available under the statute at issue (the UADA)
was less generous and the time period for bringing a claim was shorter than at
common law in tort. Indeed, the Retherford Court observed that the very
reason the plaintiff in that case had asserted a common-law wrongful
discharge cause of action instead of a claim under the UADA was precisely
because she preferred the broader remedies and the more generous time
periods available under the common-law claim. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 961
(“Retherford argues that the UADA has no preemptive effect because she hopes
to avoid its provisions and pursue her common law remedies.). Nonetheless,
this Court held her common law claim preempted by the UADA. Id. at 966-

967.
Similarly, under the field preemption test applied Gottling, this Court
held that the UADA bars all common-law remedies for employment
discrimination, even in situations where the UADA offers no remedy
whatsoever to employees because they are employed by employers with less
than 15 employees, which are not subject to the prohibitions of the UADA.
2002 UT 95, ¶¶20, 21. Thus, the fact that a statute provides more limited
remedies for an injury than those available at common law, or that it may
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provide no remedy at all for a particular plaintiff, has no bearing on whether a
common law cause of action is preempted.
CONCLUSION
As set forth above, the district court properly held Graham’s wrongful
discharge claim preempted under the indispensable element test adopted by
this Court in Retherford. Graham does not directly challenge, or even address,
this holding. Rather, Graham ignores it and seeks to avoid preemption solely
by challenging the district court’s alternative holding that his claim is
preempted by the more generally applicable preemption analysis applied by
this Court in Gottling. Graham should not be permitted to do so.
The indispensable element test is a specialized test adopted by this Court
for the precise circumstances here—where a statute addresses an injury that
is an indispensable element of a cause of action asserted by a plaintiff.
Retherford, 844 P.2d at 964-966; see Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶¶ 10, 11 n.1;
Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ¶ 8, n.1. As set forth above, the UOSH Act specifically
addresses discharge in retaliation for exercising a right under the UOSH Act,
and this injury is an indispensable element of Graham’s claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of the public policy embodied in the UOSH Act against
retaliation for exercising a right under the UOSH Act. Graham’s claim is
therefore preempted by the UOSH Act.
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Graham’s claim is similarly preempted under the more generally
applicable preemption analysis set forth in Gilger and Gottling. See Gilger,
2000 UT 23 at ¶¶ 11-13; Gottling, 2002 UT 95 ¶¶ 8-14. As discussed above, a
preemptive intent is implied by the structure and purpose of the UOSH Act—
both in the pervasiveness of its provisions relating to retaliation and in the fact
that recognition of Graham’s cause of action would stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of the UOSH
Act.
Graham seeks to proceed in tort for the admitted reason that his
potential recovery in tort is more generous than that under the UOSH Act.
This is irrelevant, however, to the question of preemption, and Graham should
not be permitted to circumvent the express remedy for alleged retaliatory
discharge provided by the UOSH Act. Accordingly, this Court should affirm
the district court’s ruling and remand this case for further proceedings below.
DATED this 1st day of July 2019.

/s/ Mark A. Wagner
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee
Albertson’s, LLC.
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ADDENDUM

Item 1:

Utah Code § 34A-5-203

Item 2:

Utah Code § 34A-5-110

Item 3:

Utah Admin Code R614-1-10

R614-1-10. Discrimination.
A. General.
1. The Act provides, among other things, for the adoption of
occupational safety and health standards, research and development
activities, inspections and investigations of work places, and
record keeping requirements. Enforcement procedures initiated by
the Commission; review proceedings as required by Title 63G, Chapter
4, Administrative Procedures Act; and judicial review are provided
by the Act.
2. This rule deals essentially with the rights of employees
afforded under section 34A-6-203 of the Act. Section 34A-6-203 of
the Act prohibits reprisals, in any form, against employees who
exercise rights under the Act.
3.
The purpose is to make available in one place
interpretations of the various provisions of Section 34A-6-203 of
the Act which will guide the Administrator in the performance of
his duties thereunder unless and until otherwise directed by
authoritative decisions of the courts, or concluding, upon
reexamination of an interpretation, that it is incorrect.
B. Persons prohibited from discriminating.
Section 34A-6-203 defines employee protections under the Act,
because the employee has exercised rights under the Act. Section
34A-6-103(11) of the Act defines "person".
Consequently, the
prohibitions of Section 34A-6-203 are not limited to actions taken
by employers against their own employees. A person may be chargeable
with discriminatory action against an employee of another person.
Section 34A-6-203 would extend to such entities as organizations
representing
employees
for
collective
bargaining
purposes,
employment agencies, or any other person in a position to
discriminate against an employee. (See, Meek v. United States, F.
2d 679 (6th Cir., 1943); Bowe v. Judson C. Burnes, 137 F 2d 37 (3rd
Cir., 1943).)
C. Persons protected by section 34A-6-203.
1. All employees are afforded the full protection of Section
34A-6-203.
For purposes of the Act, an employee is defined in
Section 34A-6-103(6). The Act does not define the term "employ".
However, the broad remedial nature of this legislation demonstrates
a clear legislative intent that the existence of an employment
relationship, for purposes of Section 34A-6-203, is to be based upon
economic realities rather than upon common law doctrines and
concepts.
For a similar interpretation of federal law on this
issue, see, U.S. v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947); Rutherford Food
Corporation v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
2. For purposes of Section 34A-6-203, even an applicant for
employment could be considered an employee. (See, NLRB v. Lamar
Creamery, 246 F. 2d 8 (5th Cir., 1957).) Further, because Section
34A-6-203 speaks in terms of any employee, it is also clear that

the employee need not be an employee of the discriminator.
The
principal consideration would be whether the person alleging
discrimination was an "employee" at the time of engaging in
protected activity.
3. In view of the definitions of "employer" and "employee"
contained in the Act, employees of a State or political subdivision
thereof would be within the coverage of Section 34A-6-203.
D. Unprotected activities distinguished.
1. Actions taken by an employer, or others, which adversely
affect an employee may be predicated upon nondiscriminatory grounds.
The proscriptions of Section 34A-6-203 apply when the adverse action
occurs because the employee has engaged in protected activities.
An employee's engagement in activities protected by the Act does
not automatically render him immune from discharge or discipline
for legitimate reasons, or from adverse action dictated by nonprohibited considerations. (See, NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp.,
128 F. 2d 201 (5th Cir., 1942).)
2.
To establish a violation of Section 34A-6-203, the
employee's engagement in protected activity need not be the sole
consideration behind discharge or other adverse action.
If
protected activity was a substantial reason for the action, or if
the discharge or other adverse action would not have taken place
"but for" engagement in protected activity, Section 34A-6-203 has
been violated. (See, Mitchell v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 278
F. 2d 562 (8th Cir., 1960); Goldberg v. Bama Manufacturing, 302 F.
2d 152 (5th Cir., 1962).) Ultimately, the issue as to whether a
discharge was because of protected activity will have to be
determined on the basis of the facts in the particular case.
E. Specific protections-complaints under or related to the Act.
1. Discharge of, or discrimination against an employee because
the employee has filed "any complaint under or related to this Act"
is prohibited by Section 34A-6-203. An example of a complaint made
"under" the Act would be an employee request for inspection pursuant
to Section 34A-6-301(6). However, this would not be the only type
of complaint protected by Section 34A-6-203.
The range of
complaints "related to" the Act is commensurate with the broad
remedial purposes of this legislation and the sweeping scope of its
application, which entails the full extent of the commerce power.
((See Cong. Rec., vol. 116 P. 42206 December 17, 1970).)
2. Complaints registered with Federal agencies which have the
authority to regulate or investigate occupational safety and health
conditions are complaints "related to" this Act.
Likewise,
complaints made to State or local agencies regarding occupational
safety and health conditions would be "related to" the Act. Such
complaints, however, must relate to conditions at the workplace, as
distinguished from complaints touching only upon general public
safety and health.

3.
Further, the salutary principles of the Act would be
seriously undermined if employees were discouraged from lodging
complaints about occupational safety and health matters with their
employers. Such complaints to employers, if made in good faith,
therefore would be related to the Act, and an employee would be
protected against discharge or discrimination caused by a complaint
to the employer.
F. Proceedings under or related to the act.
1.
Discharge of, or discrimination against, any employee
because the employee has exercised the employee's rights under or
related to this Act is also prohibited by Section 34A-6-203.
Examples of proceedings which would arise specifically under the
Act would be inspections of work-sites under Section 34A-6-301 of
the Act, employee contest of abatement date under Section 34A-6-303
of the Act, employee initiation of proceedings for promulgation of
an occupational safety and health standard under Section 34A-6-202
of the Act and Title 63G, Chapter 3, employee application for
modification of revocation of a variance under Section 34A-6202(4)(c) of the Act and R614-1-9., employee judicial challenge to
a standard under Section 34A-6-202(6) of the Act, and employee
appeal of an order issued by an Administrative Law Judge,
Commissioner, or Appeals Board under Section 34A-6-304.
In
determining whether a "proceeding" is "related to" the Act, the
considerations discussed in R614-1-10.G. would also be applicable.
2.
An employee need not himself directly institute the
proceedings. It is sufficient if he sets into motion activities of
others which result in proceedings under or related to the Act.
G. Testimony.
Discharge of, or discrimination against, any employee because
the employee "has testified or is about to testify" in proceedings
under or related to the Act is also prohibited by Section 34A-6203. This protection would of course not be limited to testimony
in proceedings instituted or caused to be instituted by the
employee, but would extend to any statements given in the course of
judicial, quasi-judicial, and administrative proceedings, including
inspections, investigations, and administrative rulemaking or
adjudicative functions. If the employee is giving or is about to
give testimony in any proceeding under or related to the Act, he
would be protected against discrimination resulting from such
testimony.
H. Exercise of any right afforded by the Act.
1. In addition to protecting employees who file complaints,
institute proceedings under or related to the Act it also prohibited
by Section 34A-6-203 discrimination occurring because of the
exercise "of any right afforded by this Act." Certain rights are
explicitly provided in the Act; for example, there is a right to
participate as a party in enforcement proceedings (34A-6-303).

Certain other rights exist by necessary implications. For example,
employees may request information from the Utah Occupational Safety
and Health Administration; such requests would constitute the
exercise of a right afforded by the Act.
Likewise, employees
interviewed by agents of the Administrator in the course of
inspections
or
investigations
could
not
subsequently
be
discriminated against because of their cooperation.
2. Review of the Act and examination of the legislative history
discloses that, as a general matter, there is no right afforded by
the Act which would entitle employees to walk off the job because
of potential unsafe conditions at the workplace.
Hazardous
conditions which may be violative of the Act will ordinarily be
corrected by the employer, once brought to his attention.
If
corrections are not accomplished, or if there is dispute about the
existence of a hazard, the employee will normally have opportunity
to request inspection of the workplace pursuant to Section 34A-6301 of the Act, or to seek the assistance of other public agencies
which have responsibility in the field of safety and health. Under
such circumstances, therefore, an employer would not ordinarily be
in violation of Section 34A-6-203 by taking action to discipline an
employee for refusing to perform normal job activities because of
alleged safety or health hazards.
a. Occasions might arise when an employee is confronted with
a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself
to serious injury or death arising from a hazardous condition at
the workplace. If the employee, with no reasonable alternative,
refuses in good faith to expose himself to the dangerous condition,
he would be protected against subsequent discrimination.
The
condition causing the employee's apprehension of death or injury
must be of such a nature that a reasonable person, under the
circumstances then confronting the employee, would conclude that
there is a real danger of death or serious injury and that there is
insufficient time, due to the urgency of the situation, to eliminate
the danger through resort to regular statutory enforcement channels.
In addition, in such circumstances, the employee, where possible,
must also have sought from his employer, and been unable to obtain,
a correction of the dangerous condition.
I. Procedures - Filing of complaint for discrimination.
1.
Who may file.
A complaint of Section 34A-6-203
discrimination may be filed by the employee himself, or by a
representative authorized to do so on his behalf.
2.
Nature of filing.
No particular form of complaint is
required.
3.
Place of filing.
Complaint should be filed with the
Administrator, Division of Occupational Safety and Health, Labor
Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6650,
Telephone 530-6901.

4. Time for filing.
a. Section 34A-6-203(2)(b) provides protection for an employee
who believes that he has been discriminated against.
b. A major purpose of the 30-day period in this provision is
to allow the Administrator to decline to entertain complaints which
have become stale. Accordingly, complaints not filed within 30 days
of an alleged violation will ordinarily be presumed to be untimely.
c. However, there may be circumstances which would justify
tolling of the 30-day period on recognized equitable principles or
because of strongly extenuating circumstances, e.g., where the
employer has concealed, or misled the employee regarding the grounds
for discharge or other adverse action; where the employee has,
within the 30-day period, resorted in good faith to grievancearbitration proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement or
filed a complaint regarding the same general subject with another
agency; where the discrimination is in the nature of a continuing
violation. In the absence of circumstances justifying a tolling of
the 30-day period, untimely complaints will not be processed.
J. Notification of administrator's determination.
The Administrator is to notify a complainant within 90 days of
the complaint of his determination whether prohibited discrimination
has occurred.
This 90-day provision is considered directory in
nature. While every effort will be made to notify complainants of
the Administrator's determination within 90 days, there may be
instances when it is not possible to meet the directory period set
forth in this section.
K. Withdrawal of complaint.
Enforcement of the provisions of Section 34A-6-203 is not only
a matter of protecting rights of individual employees, but also of
public interest. Attempts by an employee to withdraw a previously
filed complaint will not necessarily result in termination of the
Administrator's investigation.
The Administrator's jurisdiction
cannot be foreclosed as a matter of law by unilateral action of the
employee.
However, a voluntary and uncoerced request from a
complainant to withdraw his complaint will be given careful
consideration and substantial weight as a matter of policy and sound
enforcement procedure.
L. Arbitration or other agency proceedings.
1.
An employee who files a complaint under Section 34A-6203(2) of the Act may also pursue remedies under grievance
arbitration proceedings in collective bargaining agreements.
In
addition, the complainant may concurrently resort to other agencies
for relief, such as the National Labor Relations Board.
The
Administrator's jurisdiction to entertain Section 34A-6-203
complaints, to investigate, and to determine whether discrimination
has occurred, is independent of the jurisdiction of other agencies
or bodies.
The Administrator may file action in district court

regardless of the pendency of other proceedings.
2.
However, the Administrator also recognizes the policy
favoring voluntary resolution of disputes under procedures in
collective bargaining agreements. (See, e.g., Boy's Market, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650 (1965); Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 375 U.S.
261 (1964); Collier Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150 (1971).) By
the same token, due deference should be paid to the jurisdiction of
other forums established to resolve disputes which may also be
related to Section 34A-6-203 complaints.
3. Where a complainant is in fact pursuing remedies other than
those provided by Section 34A-6-203, postponement of the
Administrator's determination and deferral to the results of such
proceedings may be in order. (See, Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., v.
U.S., 371 U.S. 156 (1962).)
4.
Postponement of determination.
Postponement of
determination would be justified where the rights asserted in other
proceedings are substantially the same as rights under Section 34A6-203 and those proceedings are not likely to violate the rights
guaranteed by Section 34A-6-203.
The factual issues in such
proceedings must be substantially the same as those raised by
Section 34A-6-203 complaint, and the forum hearing the matter must
have the power to determine the ultimate issue of discrimination.
(See, Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., F. 2d (5th Cir., 1972), 41
U.S.L.W. 1049 (October 10, 1972): Newman v. Avco Corp., 451 F. 2d
743 (6th Cir., 1971).)
5. Deferral to outcome of other proceedings. A determination
to defer to the outcome of other proceedings initiated by a
complainant must necessarily be made on a case-to-case basis, after
careful scrutiny of all available information. Before deferring to
the results of other proceedings, it must be clear that those
proceedings dealt adequately with all factual issues, that the
proceedings were fair, regular, and free of procedural infirmities,
and that the outcome of the proceedings was not repugnant to the
purpose and policy of the Act. In this regard, if such other actions
initiated by a complainant are dismissed without adjudicative
hearing thereof, such dismissal will not ordinarily be regarded as
determinative of the Section 34A-6-203 complaint.
M. Employee refusal to comply with safety rules.
Employees who refuse to comply with occupational safety and
health standards or valid safety rules implemented by the employer
in furtherance of the Act are not exercising any rights afforded by
the Act.
Disciplinary measures taken by employers solely in
response to employee refusal to comply with appropriate safety rules
and regulations, will not ordinarily be regarded as discriminatory
action prohibited by Section 34A-6-203. This situation should be
distinguished from refusals to work, as discussed in R614-1-10.H.

Item 4:

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
Granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Perform
Discovery Related to Defendant’s Wealth (October 12, 2018)
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